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Abstract: This article explores whether a new east ‑west divide exists in the enlarged 
European Union by analysing national discourses on European integration in the 
Visegrad Four (V4) states. Two V4 foreign policy legacies form the basis of analysis: 
the “Return to Europe” discourse and the discourses around the reconstruction of the 
historical self. The article gives evidence that the V4 countries share sovereignty in ex‑
ternal policies and thus have a distinct European orientation. V4 national ‑conservative 
governments hold sovereigntist positions, however, in policy areas that they consider 
falling exclusively within the realm of the member state. Comparison with Western 
European member states gives evidence that the post‑1945 paradigm changes were 
more profound than those of post‑1989 ones of Eastern Europe. This historic legacy can 
explain the more integrationist orientations in Western Europe. The article concludes 
that behaviour of the individual V4 state seems to be of greater importance for each 
member than collective V4 group action. Finally, the article gives an outlook on ways 
in which solidarity between the Western and Eastern halves of the EU can be exercised 
in an ideologically diverging Union.
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Introduction
The chapter asks whether behind discourses on European integration, which 
since the 2015 refugee crisis have entailed considerable disagreement between 
and within EU member states, we can observe a new east ‑west divide in the 
enlarged European Union, and whether, because of the importance of the 
Visegrad Four (V4) group in the EU’s eastern half, this regional grouping can 
be considered to be at the helm of such a divide.
We observe that there is evidence of both similarities and differences between 
positions that run along a line of formerly old and formerly new member states. 
We observe also that positions within the putative two blocks differ consider‑
ably. Division within a perceived “block” challenges the concept of such a divide 
and the logical level of examination thus becomes the individual EU member 
state: wherever situated, big or small, greatly exposed to refugee and migration 
flows or less so, a Eurozone member or not, a net contributor or a net recipient, 
a member state subject to many infringement proceedings or few, and subject 
to the EU rule of law mechanism or not. Furthermore, the member state is an 
actor that, depending on the policy area, often behaves flexibly and pragmati‑
cally in everyday politics. This wide array of potential variables is most likely to 
present a very mixed outcome and would hardly give evidence of an east ‑west 
divide, but could, however, be an interesting starting point for a quantitative 
analysis based on data sets that can be operationalised.
In this contribution, a qualitative analysis will be provided that draws on 
some of these variables. The method will apply a social constructivist perspective 
to the relations between EU member states on the basis of discourse analysis 
and qualitative comparative analysis. The objective is to identify foreign policy 
identities, which are guided by norms and ideas, and to analyse foreign policy 
behaviour, which is addressed to a political other. These discourses between self 
and other construct and reconstruct identities (Wendt 1999; on discourse and the 
construction of self and other Diez 2004 and Hansen 2006). Behaviour moves 
in paths, over time creating a culture and traditions. Historic turning ‑points 
in East Central Europe, with sequences of foreign subjection and self ‑rule, 
produced a set of sometimes contradictory traditions, referred to as historical 
legacies (Wittenberg 2015). Could it be that historical legacies in Western Eu‑
rope and Eastern Europe differ so greatly that they have the potential to divide 
the continent, more than twenty ‑five years after the fall of the iron curtain and 
nearly fifteen years into EU membership?
East Central Europe: two legacies since 1989
With the two basic concepts to be laid out below, we follow Elsa Tulmets’ book 
East Central European Foreign Policy Identity in Perspective (Tulmets 2014). Here 
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she observes two legacies. The first is the “Return to Europe” line of thought, 
which emerged in both Eastern and Western Europe. The continued illegitimacy 
of the socialist one ‑party states, the role of revolts and the legitimacy of the dis‑
sidence movements led to an enthusiastic “Return to Europe” by the new demo‑
cratically elected governments of East Central European (ECE) states. The new 
political self embraced the promotion of democracy, human rights, security and 
a market economy. This led in 1990 and 1991 (and for the peacefully separated 
Czech Republic and Slovakia again in 1993) to membership in the Council of 
Europe, in 1999 to NATO (Slovakia in 2004) and in 2004 to the European Un‑
ion. Full ‑fledged membership in these three institutions and the OECD signify 
the culmination of the Visegrad states’ “Return to Europe” and the West. The 
institutions stand for a return to a political order legitimised through democracy 
and the rule of law, a liberal economic and social order with the belief in pros‑
perity through market economy and modernisation, and a return to a security 
order through a continued Atlanticist orientation (Tulmets 2014: 60‑62). This 
“Return to Europe” was questioned by a small minority of ultranationalists on 
the right and an even smaller minority of old school communists on the left. 
Sovereigntist tendencies were overwhelmingly overridden by integrationists.
The second concept in Elsa Tulmets’ book is the definition and reconstruc‑
tion of the historical self in ECE states. At the time of EU accession, Hungarian 
political scientist László J. Kiss highlighted this second concept when in 2004, 
he wrote:
The all too frequently repeated cliché ‘return to Europe’ means more than 
advancing towards West European and Atlantic institutions; it also means the 
return to ‘old’ neighbourhoods and interrelated problems, i.e. history itself. 
For […] the region the regime change comprised the simultaneous re ‑conquest 
of their history […]. (Kiss 2004: 66)
In this concept, the weight of a nation’s history is an important factor in the 
definition of its identity. All of the countries in ECE have experienced a problem‑
atic relationship between their sense of state and their sense of nation. In their 
own ways, all have historically struggled with both self ‑rule and the dominating 
influence of foreign powers in the region. Despite a Western, and to a lesser 
extent regional orientation in all major political camps, the European dividing 
line ran between a more universalistic liberal approach to formulating identity 
on behalf of the moderate left and an ethno ‑cultural approach to formulating 
identity by the national ‑conservative right.
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A new experience since 2004: sharing sovereignty in EU policies
Tulmets’ text continues to analyse in detail contributions of ECE states to the 
EU foreign policies towards the eastern and south ‑eastern neighbourhoods, 
namely participation in the Eastern Partnership and EU enlargement policies 
(Tulmets 2014: 147‑184). Since 2004, a “Europeanisation” of the foreign poli‑
cies of the Visegrad states has taken place in this respect, and the text rightfully 
labels this as a “turn” (Tulmets 2014: 151) in ECE foreign policy behaviour. 
A case study of mine on Visegrad Four relations towards Bosnia confirms this 
integrationist behaviour (Walsch 2015). The new ECE identity of being a suc‑
cessful transformer, and subsequently achieving full membership to the EU, 
is used to serve as an example in these eastern and south ‑eastern regions that 
are being encouraged to develop along the same path. Domestic divisions and 
diverging political identities in Visegrad countries have, overall, little or no 
impact in these multilateral formats.
Tulmets also observes a “foreign policy consistency through the presidencies 
of the Visegrad Group and of the EU Council” (Tulmets: 185–219, citation 185). 
Such presidencies require a high degree of co ‑ordination and co ‑operation with 
the respective partners. Congruent with many EU member states that had held 
EU Council presidencies before, V4 states led the European Union with a dual 
strategy. On the one hand they fulfilled the role of being a ‘first among equals’ 
and an ‘honest broker.’ On the other hand, each ECE country that presided over 
the EU engaged in the thematic or geographical priorities most in line with 
its own foreign policy identity. The Hungarian presidency, for example, could 
successfully finalise the accession negotiations with the then candidate state of 
Croatia in the first half of 2011.
There is a different picture when it comes to internal European or – to use 
the term of the respective Council formation – ‘General’ affairs. National‑
‑conservative right wing parties react vehemently at the first perceived threat 
to national sovereignty, when the self that they have constructed domestically is 
encroached upon through European politics, as in rule of law issues or asylum 
policies. When analysing Visegrad Four co ‑operation in earlier contributions 
of mine, I distinguished an “internal” from an “external” dimension (Walsch 
2014: 30–35). In accordance with Tulmets’ findings above, I found overwhelm‑
ing evidence that co ‑operation is by and large successful as long as a third 
party is concerned. Regardless, the Visegrad Four shy away from agendas that 
may limit each other’s sovereignty in a wide array of policy areas of domestic 
relevance (ibid). V4 partners do not want to touch each other’s sovereignty, 
however they occasionally will in the bilateral format. The short ‑term domestic 
gain of non ‑involvement seems to outscore a potential win ‑win ‑situation of 
deeper co ‑operation. At the EU level, the behaviour of V4 governments with 
nationalist and thus sovereigntist inclinations unfold along the same pattern.
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More than twenty ‑five years after the fall of the iron curtain, and after twelve 
years of full membership in the most powerful alliance on the continent, it is 
striking that even with new shared sovereignty for ECE states, EU national‑
‑conservative parties have done little or nothing to erase or at least alter the 
overarching narrative of victimhood at the hands of some bigger outside force. 
“Brussels” is sold as “not us”: the powerful other that regularly interferes in “our” 
domestic affairs. This narrative of defending the own small nation from the big 
other has become a consistent theme in the region and fits well into the narrative 
of the 20th century tragedies of Central Europe, along with such tragedies as the 
expansion of Nazi Berlin and of communist Moscow. In reality, decision ‑making 
has changed completely since 2004. Today Brussels is Budapest, Brussels is 
Warsaw, etc. Communist Moscow and Nazi Berlin were not. What is self and 
what is other have changed in the everyday practice of EU governance, but the 
narrative that a bigger power from outside threatens “us” is cultivated anew 
and conveniently feeds into a seemingly uninterrupted storyline of victimhood 
and self ‑defence.
Paradigm changes: what is different in the west of the EU?
In searching for differences between former Western and former Eastern Eu‑
rope, two arguments should be brought forward. The first is that the disasters 
of fascist rule and World War II functioned in Western Europe as a catharsis 
and led to profound redefinitions of self and other. This transformation left be‑
hind the legacy of aggressive nationalisms. In post ‑war Europe, six Christian 
Democrat governments (not national ‑conservative ones) decided to form the 
European Communities (Judt 2005). Post‑1968, the West German centre ‑left 
government initiated a new Ostpolitik of co ‑operation with communist Europe, 
a move that was not renounced by subsequent centre ‑right governments. 1989‑
90 was seen as a historic turning point in the advancement of European unity 
by all major political camps across western European countries. These policies 
prove that both major political camps could leave behind earlier historic lega‑
cies of division and ideological orthodoxy for the sake of new opportunities for 
co ‑operation and eventual integration (on Germany see Ash 1993). In Eastern 
Europe, 1989 cannot be seen as a catharsis. It was simply liberation. The chance 
to critically reflect on past identities, which had been incorporated into build‑
ing the present one, was rarely undertaken. Rather recourse to legacies of the 
pro ‑communist times, the interwar period, can be observed within the politi‑
cal right. Hungary, for example, under the national ‑conservative government 
of Viktor Orbán, cultivated anew the “tragedy” of the Trianon Peace Treaty of 
1920, which had been a dominant storyline of Horthy’s interwar Hungary. In 
contrast, post‑1949 West German and post‑1990 German elites have not initi‑
ated a political discourse on the Treaty of Versailles.
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Second, the war legacy gave birth to a profound paradigm shift in conti‑
nental Western European political culture: from confrontation to consensus‑
‑orientation. Even today, after more than seventy – or in the Iberian case forty – 
years of democratic practice, we do not see a fundamental divide over European 
integration in the catch ‑all centre ‑right and centre ‑left parties. This is a remark‑
able achievement, and decision ‑making culture in European institutions reflects 
this consensus approach. It should be noted that, in the eyes of the socialist 
and social democratic parties, the European Community was initially a rather 
suspicious western capitalist undertaking, and still there was willingness from 
both sides to co ‑operate. In Eastern Europe, the round ‑table negotiations of the 
1989 revolutions, as well as the peaceful divorce of Slovakia and the Czech Re‑
public, gave proof of elite consensus orientation; likewise, few ECE government 
coalitions have crossed the sovereigntist ‑integrationist trench post‑1990. The 
abovementioned practice of sharing sovereignty and contributing to joint deci‑
sions based on consensus orientation in EU institutions can also already count 
as a newly acquired tradition. However, the older socialist legacy of superficial 
one ‑party dictated consensus ‑making and pre ‑war legacies of confrontation 
presaged the hard divisions that would arise on European issues between the 
two camps. Confrontationists – usually Kulturkampf ‑type politicians – reject 
proposals that are not their own. This consequently leads to a boycott of joint 
processes and decisions in domestic politics. On the European level, the failure 
to reach a compromise is then well exploited by sovereigntists for short ‑term 
domestic gains. A well ‑known strategy to this end is the inventing of an enemy 
along the scheme of a negative other that helps to reinforce a separated self. Also, 
it seems that confrontation – or veto ‑playing – is not helpful at the European 
level. What does prove effective, however, are the domestic traditions of con‑
sensus orientation in continental Western Europe. For example, Scandinavian 
countries have often experienced minority governments, which rely on compro‑
mises with non ‑government parties in order to reach majorities in parliament 
(Gallagher – Laver – Mair 2005: 388–391 and 395–397). In many countries, work 
in parliamentary committees also requires compromise between government 
and opposition (ibid, 64‑66). This legacy of openness proves helpful when it 
comes to co ‑shaping issues and finding majorities in various EU Council of 
Ministers configurations.
In search of solidarity
Solidarity between Western and Eastern Europe has been relentlessly under 
attack since the outbreak of the refugee crisis. Quarrels over this issue and V4 
unity on it have become, in Zsuszánna Végh’s words, a “dubious trademark” 
of Visegrad Four co ‑operation (Végh 2017). The laurels of “top democracy 
transition achievers” (Kořan 2017) can be revoked from Hungary and Poland, 
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now borne only by other ECE countries. The laurels should also be returned to 
Spain, for example, whose functioning democracy has so far been able to deal 
with a severe and prolonged economic crisis, and to a lesser extent with the 
challenges of an independence struggle in the autonomous region Catalonia.
French president Macron’s warning that the EU is not a “self ‑service super‑
market”, along with Commission President Juncker’s statement of solidarity 
being a two ‑way avenue, casts a dark shadow over today’s Kaczyńskis and Or‑
báns. Then there are also the innumerable criticisms from the centre ‑left, among 
them those from acting and former prime ministers of Western European EU 
countries. Such cumulated criticism tipped off the Visegrad Four prime min‑
isters, and recent V4 statements on the refugee issue have dropped the term 
“solidarity” like a hot potato (The Visegrad Group 2017). There is also evidence 
that some hard ‑line positions were removed from official V4 statements in re‑
sponse to Czech and Slovak pressure (Dostál 2017; Cabada 2018). One could 
label this divided constellation V2+2. However, whenever disagreement flares 
among Visegrad partners, it is consequently sold as flexibility. To be sure, V4 
is alive in a number of policy areas, but is currently in crisis over the refugee 
issue, that same issue that united the four countries in 2015, at the time when 
the different reactions vis ‑à ‑vis Russia’s aggression against Ukraine held the 
Four hostage in a previous crisis… (for a good discussion on V4 and Russia 
and Ukraine see Kucharczyk and Mesežnikov 2015). Considerable V4 disagree‑
ment over both the Ukraine and the refugee issues show that consensus among 
the four partners is limited to the extent that it becomes difficult to recognize 
a common position.
On a more abstract level, it is important to explore the definitions of solidar‑
ity within the EU. At the heart of the EU solidarity debate is the mainstream 
conviction that one type of solidarity, for example cohesion funding, does not 
go without the other, in this case burden ‑sharing in the refugee issue. Focus‑
ing just on the issues of the refugee crisis, the mainstream conviction is that 
solidarity encompasses both an external and an internal dimension. This means 
that common EU (Schengen) external border protection goes hand in hand 
with the establishment of a common European asylum policy, the correspond‑
ing internal dimension. The governments of the V4 states nevertheless insist 
on a separation of the two dimensions and advocate more flexible approaches. 
V4 supports common policies on border protection and fighting root causes of 
migration, but ferociously reject any common European approach to asylum 
and migration policies.
This is seen by Western European countries as a cherry ‑picking, a ‑la ‑carte‑
‑type solidarity at the discretion of the single EU member state. Negotiations 
over the EU ‑budget 2021‑27 will bring this debate to its inevitable climax. The 
EU budget will shrink due to the exit of the net ‑contributor Great Britain. More 
importantly, the wealthy EU states of Western and Northern Europe will be cast 
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into a stronger position as the remaining net ‑contributors to the EU budget. It 
is possible that these countries will take the opportunity to limit budgets for 
future EU cohesion funding, due to a perceived lack of solidarity on behalf of 
the V4 and other ECE states. The southern EU states of Italy, Greece, and Spain, 
who are all heavily exposed to refugee and migration flows, are not particularly 
keen to further endow their stubborn Eastern cousins, when rather EU solidar‑
ity is needed in tackling this paramount and Europe ‑wide issue. Despite a rift 
within the EU between ‘North’ and ‘South’ on how to move forward regarding 
governance of the Euro, southern EU states can presently count on the solidar‑
ity of their northern partners. Thus, it is the V4 states that are rather isolated 
in this matter.
A final important point of the solidarity debate regards European Union 
Treaty obligations and the “rules ‑based” order, lying at the heart of the whole Eu‑
ropean integration framework. It can be illustrated by the impact of the Justice 
and Home Affairs Council Decision of 22 September 2015, which had prescribed 
the compulsory distribution of a small number of refugees with granted asylum 
status from Italy and Greece to all other EU member states (Council of the Euro‑
pean Union 2015). The Council Decision did not pass unanimously, but rather 
with a qualified majority. Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Romania 
voted against it; Finland abstained. (The then pro ‑European Polish government 
voted in favour. A new Czech government, in place since December 2017, an‑
nounced that it would maintain the position of its predecessor.) This compulsory 
relocation scheme dictated that 1294 refugees be relocated to Hungary, 5082 
to Poland, 802 to Slovakia and 1591 to the Czech Republic (ibid). Slovakia 
and Hungary appealed against the Council Decision at the European Court of 
Justice, but lost their case. The Court ruled that the decision had been made 
in accordance with the Treaties of the European Union, and consequently EU 
member states are obliged to implement the Council Decision (Court of Justice 
of the European Union 2017). Currently three governments – those of Hungary, 
Poland and the Czech Republic – further insist on non ‑implementation. In many 
European capitals, this continued stubbornness is interpreted as a violation of 
the rules ‑based order with which every member must comply. Continued non‑
‑compliance can quickly bring into question the sense of the whole edifice of 
co ‑operation and solidarity. Seen through the lens of future EU cohesion fund‑
ing, net ‑contributors have leverage over those members who violate the rule 
of law, and can impose much stricter conditions concerning the use of future 
cohesion budgets. In the worst ‑case scenario, net ‑contributors may consider 
stopping cohesion funding for members that violate the rule of law principle 
and setting up new schemes for those members and initiatives that comply 
with common rules and regulations. As the conclusions will demonstrate, the 
worst ‑case scenario could even have this happening in bi‑ and multilateral 
agreements outside European Union structures.
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Conclusions: any alternatives?
Despite the advantages and disadvantages of regional co ‑operation, it is the 
individual member state that will be appraised by Brussels. Two issues against 
a number of member states – all of which are situated in the ECE region – are 
currently at the forefront. First, the rule of law mechanism (which is related, 
but still different from judgements of the European Court of Justice on spe‑
cific cases or proceedings) is in force for Poland and Hungary. After years of 
intensive consultation, the European Commission decided to activate Article 
7 of the Treaty of the European Union against Poland in December 2017 due 
to non ‑compliance with this mechanism (European Commission 2017). This 
could eventually lead to the loss of EU voting rights for the country. Second, the 
aforementioned dispute and Council infringement proceedings over the com‑
pulsory relocation of the assigned number of refugees is in place for Hungary, 
the Czech Republic and Poland, supported by the European Court of Justice 
ruling from September 2017. This presents evidence that Visegrad states, apart 
from making occasional gestures towards each other that cost nothing, act and 
react individually. Slovakia, for example, is concerned in neither the first nor 
in the second issue.
The alternative to this situation is something that the Visegrad Four tried 
to prevent at the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the European Union in 
Rome: differentiated integration. Closer co ‑operation of those willing to co‑
‑operate more closely sounded, in Visegrad parlance, like a cold shoulder of 
arrogant Western Europe against their marginalised Eastern relatives. Whether 
this was another act of self ‑victimization is a matter of opinion. A watered ‑down 
version with the wording that all members “will act together, at different paces 
and intensity where necessary […] in line with the treaties” was eventually 
agreed upon by all EU partners in the Rome Declaration of March 2017 (Eu‑
ropean Union 2017). Further signs point to closer co ‑operation in a number 
of policy areas as envisaged and initiated by France and Germany. The door is 
open to all and treaty changes may happen eventually. Visegrad can and will 
reform in a number of policy areas, but refrain from others. All V4 countries will 
participate, for example, in the newly founded “Permanent Structured Coopera‑
tion” in defence and security issues. The alternatives for governments outside 
the mainstream are rather simple: either co ‑shape an agenda with like ‑minded 
partners or veto an initiative. The power of the veto ‑players is yet limited. 
A number of agreements that deal with the handling of the euro crises of the 
2010s indicate that in case disagreement overrides a reform process, member 
states can resort to bi‑ and multilateral agreements outside Union structures. 
Such arrangements will always play in the hands of those who conclude them. 
With that in mind, self ‑exclusion is something that governments in the region 
should seek to avoid.
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